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Jason Stanley’s goal is “to explain how sincere well-meaning people, under 
the grips of flawed ideology, can unknowingly produce and consume 
propaganda”. At the center of this book is a specific and intriguing analysis of 
propaganda. In its essence, propaganda is a kind of speech that mobilizes 
political, economic, aesthetic or rational ideals for political purposes (52). 
While supportive propaganda helps the realization of the ideals that it 
mobilizes, Stanley is most concerned with undermining propaganda, which he 
sees as a distinctive problem for liberal democracies: “the species of 
propaganda that centrally concerns me in this book, the kind that 
characteristically masks the gap between the given ideal and reality by the 
propagandistic use of that very ideal” (51). This appeals to an ideal in the 
service of a goal that tends to subvert this ideal: for example, appealing to the 
values of stability and peace in order to justify the invasion of Iraq. This is not 
a normative distinction, as supportive propaganda can aid repugnant ideals 
and undermining propaganda can overcome obstacles to the realization of 
desirable ideals (Stanley discusses John Coltrane’s and Lauryn Hill’s versions 
of “My Favorite Things” as instances of the latter). Cutting across this 
distinction between supportive and undermining propaganda is 
demagoguery, which by definition serves unworthy political ideals. Most 
insidious of all is undermining demagoguery, “a contribution to public 
discourse that is presented as an embodiment of a worthy political, economic, 
or rational ideal, but is in the service of a goal that tends to undermine that 
very ideal” (69). For instance, the judicial process can fail to meet its own 
worthy ideals by being seized by a flawed ideology: the “flawed ideology of 
Black exceptionalism with regard to reactions to drugs masks the 
contradiction between the attractive ideal of law and order, or justice, and the 
otherwise obviously unjust sentencing disparities between the degraded 
version of the substance used by poor Blacks and the purer version favored 
by wealthy Whites. The goal of establishing the sentencing disparities is not 
consistent with law and order, but the ideal used in the service of the goal is 
law and order” (60). This forms the focus of Stanley’s book since he thinks it is 
more devious and complicated than other forms of propaganda, and requires 
unmasking. In particular, it raises a question about how it is effective, given 
the practical conflict that it embodies between the worthy ideals it invokes 
and the actual ideals that it serves. 
 
Here Stanley brings to bear current strands in the philosophy of language and 
epistemology. In part (in line with the work of Rae Langton and others on 
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pornography and subordinating speech), Stanley sets out how formal tools of 
semantics and pragmatics can be used to identify problematic effects of 
language. Stanley explores this through a linguistic distinction between the 
explicit at-issue content of utterances and not-at-issue content: even where the 
at-issue content of a statement seems reasonable the not-at-issue content can 
propagandize. So “there will be expressions that have normal contents, which 
express these contents via a way that erodes empathy for a group” (139), 
particularly through explicitly or implicitly derogatory terms and labels 
(“illegal alien”) and social meanings that subordinate particular groups 
(“welfare”).  
 
The linguistic mechanisms employing these labels and meanings themselves 
gain a grip on us through exploiting flawed ideological beliefs that we hold. 
Drawing on Sally Haslanger and Tommie Shelby, Stanley views ideologies as 
social “scripts” that shape our normative and practical expectations, and 
which are embedded in the structures and practices of our societies. The 
beliefs that are part of an ideology are unreflective and built on convention, 
connected to positive self-image and sense of identity as well as self-interest. 
While ideologies in this sense are ubiquitous and not all ideologies are 
epistemologically disabling, flawed ideologies prevent us from gaining 
knowledge of important features of reality, including social reality. Among 
the vivid array of examples Stanley supplies is Iris Murdoch’s account in The 
Sovereignty of Good of a mother-in-law M finding her daughter-in-law D 
“lacking in dignity and refinement”, “vulgar” and “noisy”. Over time, M 
recognizes the inadequacy of her evaluative vocabulary and why she was 
gripped by it: D’s behavior that appeared as vulgar and undignified now 
seems “refreshingly simple” and “spontaneous”. The evaluative framework 
that the first set of terms rested in comes to seem old-fashioned, narrow-
minded and snobbish, held in place by M’s jealousy.  
 
Flawed ideologies characteristically arise under conditions of social 
inequality: for instance, as legitimating myths for the rule of a dominant class. 
However, what principally constitutes them as flawed is their epistemic 
defectiveness. Stanley offers an eclectic and wide-ranging account of how an 
unequal society is plagued by epistemic problems, drawing on critical race 
theory, feminism, accounts of epistemic injustice, the social psychology of 
“stereotype threat”, Walter Lippmann, Gottleb Frege. The concepts that make 
up an ideology may misrepresent social reality, imputing to it a convenient 
hierarchy of worth between different groups of people, or they may lack 
crucial terms for capturing reality that then need to be forged and established 
(sexual harassment, for instance). More broadly (and here Stanley elaborates 
some of his own work on the interest-relativity of knowledge), material 
inequality promotes forms of epistemic exclusion. Ideologies are hard to 
change as they are linked to identity and self-worth. So Stanley is skeptical 
about the search for a strategy that individuals can use to fend off ideology. 
Rather, “[w]hat is needed to eliminate problematic ideological belief is to 
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change the practice of a large group of people simultaneously over time, to 
alter a social identity many people share” (186). 
 
This is a searching, eclectic, lively and personal book. It is an important 
response to the coded speech, dog whistle politics and epistemic bubbles that 
still seems inadequately comprehended by political theorists. Stanley 
refreshingly skips the customary tour through familiar theories of ideology 
(although something called “Karl Marx’s classic paper ‘The German 
Ideology’” is referenced). Perhaps this is because he thinks that “[a]nalytic 
epistemology is supposed to possess rigor but lack importance. The theory of 
ideology is supposed to lack rigor but have importance”(264). A price for this 
is that some potentially interesting relationships go unexplored, including 
Habermas on distorted communication, Elster on the social psychology of 
belief formation, and Freeden on semantic spaces. The book fizzes with 
interesting and relevant examples, setting lots of hares running – far too many 
to capture in this review (including discussion of education and 
progressivism in the USA, prisons reform, Viktor Klemperer on the lingua 
tertii imperii) – and there is plenty to engage and provoke, both in Stanley’s 
appraisal of particular cases and in his more sweeping judgments. (I 
particularly liked the suggestion that “[n]ormative political philosophy that 
fails to place political illusion at the same level of importance as political ideal 
[sic] faces the legitimate objection that the practice of normative political 
philosophy is itself part of the machinery that produces illusion: in this case, 
the illusion that there is no illusion” (33).) The book may even suit the robust 
general reader with the patience to be led through Stalnaker’s metaphysics of 
modal semantics. 
 
One of the book’s idiosyncrasies lies in its particular focus on undermining 
propaganda, which subverts the ideals that it ostensibly promotes. Stanley 
thinks of this as particularly problematic for democracies, since it gains its 
appeal from insidious ideological mechanisms that need unmasking. Yet it is 
not obvious that it is more insidious, or more in need of explanation, than 
propaganda that isn’t self-subverting in this way but poses other problems: 
for example, it frames people’s interests in ways that in fact do not serve those 
interests, or it exploits the ambiguities in the values invoked (“security”, 
“patriotism”) as a vehicle to achieve its goals. There seems to be plenty of 
propaganda (including a lot cited by Stanley) that is problematic for 
democracies but does not fall into his category of undermining demagoguery.  
To take one kind of example, Stanley quotes the broadcaster Dan Rather in 
the wake of 9/11 saying that he wants to “fulfill [his] role as a decent human 
member of the community and a decent and patriotic American” and 
“therefore” is “willing to give the government, the president and the military 
the benefit of any doubt here in the beginning” (242). Where you see this 
statement sitting in Stanley’s typology, and therefore what (if any) pragmatic 
contradictions you find in it seems to have a lot to do with ideological 
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commitments, prior to the explanatory task (if you think there is one in this 
case) of unmasking.  
 
There is also something idiosyncratic in the book’s approach to ideology. In 
spite of the book’s impressive range (and the author’s professional expertise), 
Stanley’s inspirations seem to be Lippmann and Chomsky, who contrast a 
hard-headed view of social and political reality with the images and 
stereotypes that serve powerful social interests and feed on our cognitive 
shortcomings.  Stanley’s official statement is that the role of flawed 
ideological belief is to mask the contradictions of undermining propaganda 
(57). From this perspective, ideology’s epistemic failings and blindspots are 
crucial to its role in explaining how propaganda works. Yet, as Stanley’s more 
detailed account of ideology as script suggests, ideology does not only mask 
the contradictions of undermining propaganda but enables them, in at least 
two ways. First, if we think of the example of institutional racism in 
sentencing policy that Stanley discusses, it seems inadequate to think of the 
particular racist ideology he identifies as only serving to mask the 
contradiction, providing an explanation for those susceptible to it of the 
differences between an ideal of equality before the law and actual practice. It 
seems to make more sense to see the ideological belief as informing the 
decision-making practice, not merely the set of beliefs that don’t allow us to 
see that it is in conflict with an ideal of equality. Indeed, for a fully paid-up 
subscriber to the racist ideology, there is no contradiction to mask here, since 
the reasons offered in the ideology offer articulated grounds for the disparity 
in sentencing. Instead, we need the concept of ideology in order to 
understand or explain this point of view. 
 
Taken together, the restricted focus on undermining propaganda and on 
ideology as the epistemic muddle that makes space for this undermining 
propaganda promote a peculiarly conservative agenda in much of the text, 
which explores how the “worthy” ideals of liberal democracies (indeed, of the 
founding fathers, at one point) are subverted by epistemically flawed 
ideologies. By setting up undermining propaganda as a matter of ideals that 
have been judged worthy by some prior process, Stanley’s analysis is 
insulated from the thought (represented by Schmitt among others in his text) 
that undermining propaganda should be viewed not only as a subversion of 
public ideals but as a symptom of their true character, at least once they are 
seen as beliefs embedded in an ideological context rather than in some purely 
abstracted way.  
 
 
 
